Option A: Attribute genuine semantic properties to the expressions of particular languages (e.g. English) as well as to LoT (Fodor' Option A is the traditional one of course. But we should at least entertain Option B, notwithstanding its prima facie improbability. This is what I propose to do. In aid of this, I
will appeal to a conceptual project that I and colleagues have been developing: the representational hypothesis (RH). The RH offers a perspective from which it can be seen to be not only unnecessary but incorrect to suppose that expressions of particular languages have semantics. Here I can only sketch the idea briefly.
2 Presented so baldly, it will seem rather startling. From an unlikely angle, it points in the direction of the strongest of Recanati's (2004:Ch. 9 ) forms of Contextualism: 'Meaning Eliminativism'. It follows from the RH that English (for example) indeed has no semantics. So it can't inherit semantics from LoT. Nevertheless, it follows naturally from the RH that English will -though only to speakers of English -seem to inherit semantics from LoT. Seeming-to-inherit and actually inheriting are different and call for different theoretical models.
Having presented the RH, I will explore the semantic instability in RT by pointing up a crucially related instability in its notion of 'encoding'.
The Representational Hypothesis.
A supposed truism of linguistic theory -Saussurian and Chomskian at least -is that it is necessary to posit entities having properties relating to both sound and 'meaning'. In
Minimalism for example it is assumed that, when a lexical item is selected by the syntactic computation, what's [93] selected is a (Saussurian) object constituted both by syntacticosemantic and phonological/phonetic properties. At a point in the computation (called 'Spell-Out'), the phonological properties of expressions are stripped out and fed to the phonology. This takes them to PF (Phonetic Form), the interface with articulatoryperceptual systems. What's left in the computation continues on to LF (Logical Form), the interface with the conceptual-intentional system (LoT).
This -and the general idea of 'sound with a meaning' -is Chomsky's 'DOUBLE INTERFACE' view of expressions and the computation (1995:2). The computation compositionally projects sound-meaning correspondences encoded in lexical items onto an array of more complex expressions. This double-interface view is thought to be necessary if linguistic communication is to be possible (Chomsky 1995:221) . What has syntacticosemantic properties, it is assumed, must also have phonological properties if it is to be utterable -'tokened' or 'realised' -in the acoustic medium of speech.
I'll mention here just two reasons for questioning this picture of things. The first is this.
If the computation compositionally projects lexical sound-meaning correspondences (Saussurian signs), we should expect it to preserve those correspondences and thus expect isomorphism of phonology and syntactico-semantics in the complex expressions it generates. But, as is well known, this expectation is comprehensively defeated -by 'the fact that objects appear in the sensory output in positions "displaced" from those in which they are interpreted' (Chomsky 1995:221-2) . The very oddity of this way of expressing the matter reflects the problem posed by the double-interface assumption. How can one and the same single object be heard in one position and yet be interpreted as in another position? If, as Cormack & Smith (1997:224) between a phonetically constituted M-representation R on the one hand, and, on the other, the structured conceptual (syntactico-semantic) object that R is an M-representation of.
[95]
Viewed from this perspective, the traditional double-interface view conflates representans and representatum: by including phonology -along with structured semantics -within the generative system, it conflates facts concerning WHAT-is-represented with independent facts concerning HOW-it-is-represented in the acoustic medium. Notice, too, that the double-interface Saussurian sign treats as a (further) ENTITY what is in reality just a (semiotic) RELATION between entities.
I can now explain my earlier scare quotes round 'sound-meaning relation'. In that phrase, the relational term 'meaning' suggests that whatever-it-is-that-sounds-relate-to should be thought of as a property-of the sound (cf Chomsky's 'sound with a meaning').
The RH, by contrast, seeks to emphasise that what the sounds relate to is an independent object, with an independent rationale. It is a conceptual-intentional (C-I) structure, an object not defined by (and innocent of) the fact that sounds relate to it -and not a property of sound. It is the C-I structure that HAS semantics; it is not the case that the C-I structure IS the semantics-OF anything (let alone sounds).
Let me emphasise here that I don't deny that relevant sounds 'have meaning' (for someone wholly mind-internal. These are generally agreed to be the properties of LoT itself.
However, as conceived of by Chomsky, HFL must be distinct from LoT because HFL includes phonology (it being a double-interface system). Here's the implication then.
Having excluded phonology FROM HFL -on grounds of its M-representational relation TO HFL -the RH asks why HFL (thought of as a 'real object of the natural world' -Chomsky 1995:11) and LoT should not be identified. That they are one and the same is the most parsimonious assumption. And Chomsky's claims about HFL seem most clearly sustainable if HFL and LoT are indeed the same. I'll assume without further ado that they should be identified, sometimes calling the result 'L'. 6 The second implication is really a cluster of implications -for 'phonology' and 'particular languages'. It is, or should be, uncontroversial that a phonological system is a
system that determines what counts as a well-formed phonetic string. Now, for the RH, relevant phonetic strings are M-representational. For the RH, then, a phonological system
[97] is a system that determines what counts as a well-formed phonetic M-representation.
Of course, what counts as well-formed M-representational phonetic string differs from language to language. It depends on the particular language -i.e. on its particular representational conventions. Now, arguably, a particular language just IS the set of its particular conventions. Accordingly, the RH identifies particular languages AS phonological systems. More specifically, each particular (spoken) language is a distinct, The RH offers a fleshing-out of Fodor's contention that 'learning English isn't learning a theory about what its sentences mean [i.e. their putative semantics -NBR], it's learning how to associate its sentences with the corresponding thoughts'. What's learnt is a system of (phonologically constituted) conventions for the phonetic M-representation of the syntactico-semantic properties of LoT.
Varieties of 'encoding' in Relevance Theory
I want here to explore Relevance theory's notion of 'encoding' in the light of the above and thereby show that the RH is considerably more consistent with the quote from Fodor than RT itself is.
The RH was developed in response to problems at the syntax-phonology interface in Encoding deals merely with (non-conceptual-intentional) relations between one symbolic system and another. RT's 'linguistic semantics' refers to a system of utterable symbols and its encoding relation to L. As with Morse code, all that is needed or appropriate here is not a SEMANTICS for the encoding system but a set of CODING CONVENTIONS. On these terms, particular languages, as mere codes, don't have semantics.
The force of Lewis' (important) distinction rests crucially upon a further distinction, however: that between the ENCODING with WHAT IS ENCODED. To maintain Lewis' encoding/semantics distinction, we must be careful not to conflate the encoding and what is encoded. That would risk attributing the genuine ('real') semantic properties of L (LoT)
to mere encodings of them in the (utterable) symbols of particular languages. If we maintain these distinctions, then no remotely semantic properties can be attributed to the utterable encodings of a particular language.
All this suggests something similar, even identical, to the representational hypothesis.
'Encoding' on these terms amounts to the RH's 'M-representation'. On that assumption, call it 'M-ENCODING'.
All this notwithstanding, RT generally operates with a quite different notion of 'encoding', inherited from the double-interface tradition. That is, when it characterizes an expression E as 'encoding' some conceptual-logical property f, RT attributes f to E, as a property-of E. Let's call this notion of encoding 'C-ENCODING'. 'C-' is for 'Constitutive'.
C-encodings are CONSTITUTED by the properties they encode (as well as by phonetic properties -i.e. by how they encode it). This 'C-' notion of encoding, I suggest, completely undoes the appeal to Lewis and undermines Claim 1. It also gives rise to a range of problems which I will illustrate by reference to negation, narrowing, and numerals.
[99]
Problems with C-encoded negation.
Carston ( Furthermore, if the English word not C-encodes -and thus is -a logical operator, there must be scope-of-negation WITHIN THE LINGUISTIC ENCODING. Where real negation is, there also is scope of negation. Against this, it is often unclear from the linguistic encoding what the scope of negation is. This is suspicious: if the linguistic encoding were such as to Cencode and thus include the logical operator, and thus have a genuine logical form, we should expect it to wear scope-of-negation on its sleeve. We can't say the encoding is scopally ambiguous if it C-encodes (and thus has) a logical form. Logical form, by definition, is not ambiguous. To admit that the linguistic encoding could be semantically ambiguous would be to concede that the linguistic encoding and logical form are distinctthat the latter isn't a property of the former -in short, that logical form is NOT C-encoded.
Ambiguity indeed is a central plank in RT's argument that truth-theoretic properties are not in the linguistic encoding but ELSEWHERE (in the C-I structures of LoT).
But for Carston (2002: Ch 4) , negation -and hence scope-of-negation -is C-encoded.
And, notwithstanding the unclarity of the encoding, she wants to avoid scopal ambiguity.
How to square this circle? She does it by insisting that (C-)encoded negation always has wide scope. When this doesn't square with the thought communicated, narrow scope is derived by pragmatic inference. Well, this does the trick, but it is somewhat stipulative.
The point is that cases in which this strategy is available are precisely cases in which there IS nothing in the linguistic encoding that indicates scope.
That scope of negation is ALWAYS pragmatically inferred is Jay Atlas ' (1989, 2005) scope neutrality thesis. For Atlas, there IS no scope of negation in the linguistic encoding (the sentence). However, it is difficult to accept this if the word not is a linguistic Cencoding of, and thus HAS, logical properties. To repeat, where real negation is, there also is scope-of-negation. Although Atlas (1989) opens with a suggestive discussion of representation (effectively -for him as for me -'M-representation'), he doesn't invoke it in connection with negation. He too assumes [100] C-encoding rather than M-encoding here.
At least, he never suggests that not doesn't have logical properties, indeed he refers to it On these terms -and as Atlas suggested -pragmatics is required, not on SOME occasions nor in order to narrow C-encoded wide-scope negation, but on ALL occasions, to infer the logical properties of the thought intended to be communicated by someontologically purely phonetic, but functionally M-representational -utterance. ambiguity' -which, as objective, is supposed to remain in the absence of subjective ambiguity. 8 The very possibility of subjective ambiguity arises precisely because linguistic encodings, as purely phonetic, are -as a matter of ontological necessity -Mrepresentationally indeterminate with respect to the thoughts they are intended to evoke.
Lexical loosening and narrowing
I am suggesting that, while RT operates (in the light of Lewis' semantics-encoding distinction) with M-encoding at a general level, when it comes [101] to the analysis of particular phenomena (e.g. negation) it in fact operates with C-encoding. This is particularly apparent in RT's approach lexical semantics and pragmatics.
It is clearly C-encoding that underlies the distinction between pragmatic narrowing (enrichment) and loosening (broadening) - Carston (2002: ch. 5) . That is, it is assumed that there are two conceptual domains: (a) C-encoded in words -these are 'lexical concepts' -and (b) in LoT, actually entertained in thought. Loosening and narrowing are involved in getting from conceptual domain (a) to conceptual domain (b). Take loosening first.
Examples are bald and raw. These words are assumed to C-encode the non-gradient, absolute concepts HAIRLESS and UNCOOKED respectively. However, it is not generally (indeed hardly ever) the lexical concept that's actually entertained in thought but one of a range of distinct, looser, gradiently related concepts.
Now it could be argued that it is empirically incorrect (i) to pick the non-gradient concept as the (C-)encoded lexical concept and posit loosening when necessary, rather than
(ii) pick a gradient concept and positing narrowing when necessary. My contention, rather, is that it is arbitrary. As Robyn Carston (pc) notes, the availability of He wasn't strictly speaking bald suggests (i ii. No creature has five legs.
iii. A triangle (but not a quadrilateral) has three sides.
i. You must be eighteen to vote.
ii. If you have four children, you qualify for benefit.
(c) [AT MOST N]
i. I must pare that article down to sixty pages.
ii. We're allowed thirty days' holiday a year.
The favoured (neo-Gricean) analysis is that N is lower-bounded semantically -has (b)
as its (C-encoded) semantics -and upper-bounded by implicature (Horn 1989: Ch. 4 ). This pragmatically derives (a) from (b). However, as Carston (1988) notes, this doesn't accommodate (c). Conversely, were N semantically upper-bounded, as (c), and lowerbounded pragmatically, yielding (a), this wouldn't accommodate (b). Sadock (1984) favoured ( On the basis of such considerations, Carston (1998) The point is that C-encoding commits us to identifying a SINGLE ('lexical') concept consistent with a VARIETY of uses. But, again, even when [104] -as with N -the variety isn't huge, we seem to be facing a concept that's quite inscrutable. This is the general problem posed by the (C-encoding) assumption that a particular language constitutes a conceptual, semantic domain (of 'lexical concepts') distinct from and in addition to the conceptual semantic domain constituted by LoT. 
Carston's response.
In responding to the problem (in connection with open), Carston comes tantalisingly close to entertaining a notion of M-encoding, the M-representational relation of the RH.
C. Could it be that the word…does not encode a concept, but rather 'points' to a conceptual region…in memory? (360).
As I interpret this, Carston is here (effectively) questioning the notion of C-encoding and entertaining the possibility of M-encoding. Indeed, the pointing idea (borrowed from In the event, however, it appears that M-encoding -and thus the denial of any conceptual property (semantics) located in utterable words -is not what Carston has in mind. Instead, she replaces talk of 'encoding a concept' with talk of 'encoding a concept schema or pro-concept' (p.363) -and continues using 'encoding' in the 'C-' sense. I deal here just with 'concept schema', returning to 'pro-concept' below. Carston writes:
D. Suppose it is right that there is a sizeable class of words that do not encode particular concepts (senses) but rather concept schemas or pointers, or addresses in memory (which of these is the best metaphor remains unclear)…(p.363)
It seems that, for Carston, 'pointer' is just another metaphor along with 'concept schema'. But these -for me, at least -are utterly different. To repeat, using a phonetic pointer to (phonetically M-encoding/M-representing) [105] a conceptual region in thought doesn't require us to attribute ANY conceptual property to the word (the pointer) itselfquite the reverse. Carston's notion of 'concept schema', by contrast, seems called for precisely by the perceived need to attribute SOME kind of conceptual property to the worda need that arises only on C-encoding assumptions. Carston herself (363) alludes to the parallelism between 'concept schema' and her 'schema or template for a range of propositions'. But the latter, I've suggested (2005:396), precisely IS a proposition, albeit a very general one. By the same token, I suggest a 'concept schema' just IS a very general, highly abstract concept. 10 Despite the change in terminology, this brings us right back to the problem we started with (quote B above) -and, furthermore, the task of specifying the concept schema's content, and thus offering a substantive semantics for open (i.e. more substantive than just '[OPEN]').
On these C-encoding terms, we are going to have to admit of what Carston (very honestly) describes as 'a whole additional population of mental entities' distinct from the concepts actually entertained or entertainable in thought, which 'don't seem to have any function in mental life except to mediate the word/concept relation' (363). Furthermore, we face E.
[a] challenging question that arises concerning acquisition: if word meanings are these abstract schematic entities that do not feature in our thinking about the world, how do we ever manage to acquire (learn) them?" (363) She writes F. There must be some process of abstraction…from the particular concepts associated with the phonological form /open/ to the more general 'meaning', which then functions as a gateway both to the existing concepts of opening and to the materials needed to make new OPEN* concepts which may arise in the understanding of subsequent utterances (364).
Carston is persuaded (in contrast to Hintzman's (1986) multiple trace memory model) that the multiple traces left by experience of particular uses resolve themselves into a distinct general conceptual representation (rather like those multiple images that, seen from a distance, compose a picture of the Mona Lisa). The difficulty here is not so much how the abstraction arises -assuming that it does -but what cognitive function [106] it serves. Its function couldn't be to enable 'understanding of subsequent utterances', precisely because it arises post hoc. That is, it arises FROM, and presupposes, a prior understanding of relevant utterances. (Hintzman 1986, esp. 422-3) .
Biting the M-representational bullet.
Carston has vividly articulated a genuine problem, implied by the very idea of 'lexical' or 'linguistic semantics' and the C-encoding she assumes. Given these problems, and our overarching endeavour of identifying LoT as the sole locus of conceptuo-logical (semantic)
properties, I suggest we unequivocally jettison C-encoding in favour of M-encoding, deny that words have conceptual properties, and thereby deny the existence of 'lexical semantics' -on the grounds of the Magrittian/Peircian DISTINCTION between properties of the phonetic representans (the word) and those of the conceptual representatum. In fact, the M-representational approach goes further than Fodor. Fodor has it that WORDS have denotations (surely not consistent with the Fodor quote above). I suggest that it is particular USES of words that have denotations (Recanati 1998 Given the distinction between the M-representation and the concept it M-representsso we're not talking of any conceptual property of three itself -the circularity of using constitutes the definition of three, this approach could be seen as actually explaining that intuition.
What all this shows, more generally, is that identifying the conceptual range of uses of a word W is NOT THE SAME AS identifying W's putative semantics. It is possible, then, that the more daunting task of identifying the conceptual range of uses of the word open (which I won't attempt) wouldn't anyway yield anything that could be regarded as its semantics.
Narrowing-loosening and conceptual-procedural
Carston ( will result in 'narrowings' and others in 'loosenings'. With C-encoding (and thus 'concept adjustment'), we are not going to disband the loosening-narrowing distinction.
In which case, it is difficult to see how the results of ALL such inferences could be explicated. Of course it depends on the criterion for 'explicature' (as against 'implicature'). This is unclear in RT, since 'explicature' is defined in terms of 'development' (of the logical form of the sentence uttered) but 'development' itself is not defined -see my (2005 the lexical (C-encoded) concept. In 'loosening', by contrast, the lexical concept is not included -it is DROPPED AND REPLACED. But then how could any concept adjustment that resulted in a loosened concept count as an 'enrichment' or 'development' of the lexically encoded concept? As long as we HAVE a distinction between loosening and narrowing, I
suggest, we are not going to be able to say that concept adjustment results (across the board) in explicature, as Carston proposes.
But, again, it depends on what 'development' is -and that's the problem. The problem is not resolved -but rather intensified -when Carston suggests:
The characterization of an 'explicature' as a communicated assumption which is a development of a logical form of the utterance… can be maintained provided that the notion of a 'development' of a logical form is understood to include pragmatic adjustments to linguistically encoded concepts which may involve dropping logical or definitional elements of the encoded concepts. Instead, and across the board, we have a single inferential process from a speaker's 'phonetic effort' (Searle 1965 ) to a thought -assuming those efforts were M-representational. Now a speaker's M-representational 'phonetic effort' is what RT calls an 'ostensive acoustic stimulus'. The inference is from just such a stimulus to a thought -and it makes no sense to say that some but not all of these inferences yield 'enrichments' or 'developments' of what was 'encoded'. In fact, it makes no sense -in M-encoding termsto say ANY of them do. So, if Relevance Theory wants to say that the result of the inference is EVER explicated, we have no reason not to say that it ALWAYS is. Whatever you 'meant' -whatever concept you had in mind and were M-representing -in using tired, bald, [110] three or open, that's what you 'said', 'explicated', 'expressed' and were committed to.
In this connection, we might dismember the notion of 'pro-concept', discarding the '-concept' bit and developing the 'pro-' bit. As is well known, pro-forms (such as she and it in She carried it) are now treated in RT as having 'procedural meaning', not 'conceptual meaning'; they encode procedures that a hearer should engage in to infer explicated conceptual-intentional properties. Recall that it was precisely the attribution of 'conceptual meaning' (as against procedural meaning) to the linguistic encoding that called for the qualification embodied in Claim 2 and led to the undermining of Claim 1.
Speculating: if we want to allow that linguistic encoding ever C-ENCODES anything, we might allow that what it C-encodes is procedural. That is, since the phonetically constituted expressions of particular languages function (for those aware of the M-representational conventions of the given language) as M-representations of the conceptual-intentional structures in terms of which thought is couched , it is not unreasonable to think of those expressions as C-encoding (i.e. constituting) instructions to construct such conceptualintentional structures. In which case, the representational hypothesis might be expressed in terms of the conceptual~procedural distinction -by saying that the words of particular languages function as CONCEPTUAL M-ENCODERS in virtue of being PROCEDURAL C-ENCODERS. On these terms, all linguistic 'meaning' (encoding) is procedural -Mrepresentationally pointing the hearer towards structures in LoT, the unique locus of conceptual-intentional (i.e. semantic) properties.
Envoi.
Carston's discussion raised the general question of how we get to understand other people's uses of words. For her it is the question of how abstract lexical semantics arises
